Monthly Archives: Marzo 2013

THE PURE AND EMPTY FORM OF DEATH:THE FUSION OF MIND AND NATURE II

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FUSION OF MIND AND NATURE

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beauty, brilliance, preciousness, and vibrancy are aesthetic rather than cognitive qualifications.

The transfiguration envisaged here betrays the perspective of a transcendental aestheticism. The selection operated bythe caesura of thinking in the eternal return overthrows the sovereignty of identity in representation and the jurisdiction of explication in actuality the better to affirm the point of convergence between the dialectic of ideas and the aesthetic of intensities, thereby reuniting a purified thought and a refined sensibility.

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INTUITION NIETZSCHÉENNE DE LA RÉALITÉ POLITIQUE

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LA GRANDE POLITIQUE

 

 

 

 

 

La pensée de Nietzsche se porte sur les nécessités premières et toujours les mêmes des relations humaines, particulièrement l’état, la guerre et la paix, ensuite les situations politiques actuelles, la démocratie européenne. Ce n’est pas la détermination concrète du contenu particulier qui est essentielle à cette pensée, mais la grande intuition en tant que telle, d’où résulte la direction que prend la « grande politique ».

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EL ETERNO RETORNO DE LO MISMO:LOS ANIMALES DE ZARATUSTRA

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INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA

 

 

 

 

 

 

Interrumpimos en este lugar la interpretación del capítulo «De la visión y el enigma» para volver a recogerla posteriomente, en un contexto de las lecciones en el que, después de exponer la esencia del nihilismo como ámbito del pensamiento del eterno retorno, estemos más preparados para comprender lo que sigue. Dejaremos de lado los capítulos siguientes de la tercera parte y sólo destacaremos algunos elementos del que ocupa el cuarto lugar comenzando por el final: «El convaleciente».

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LES FANTÔMES

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STIRNER 1

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cette révolte de l’individu [contre l’Idéal élevé en tant que sacré, le culte moderne de l’Esprit et de l’Homme NdIL] est difficile, parce qu’elle a surtout à vaincre des fantômes : ceux que l’esprit humain a créés, ceux que les divers pouvoirs proposent à chacun pour mieux le contrôler.

Stirner aboutit à ce paradoxe que l’individu est asservi de manière très rigide par des idées et des êtres inconsistants. Telle la prison d’air de Merlin, des barreaux l’entourent qu’il ne peut franchir, mais qui se multiplient et restreignent son espace vital, son pouvoir.

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A PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUTURE NIHILISTIC PHILOSOPHY II

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index

 

 

 

 

It should be stressed that there is nothing inherent in rationality that makes it more coercive than intuition when used in argument. The point is simply that theprivilege of rationality over intuition is a convenient method by which to assure that the many will act in accordance with the wishes of the few. Since both rational andintuitive appeals ultimately rest on premises arrived at intuitively, the privilege of rational arguments over intuitive ones does not make the moral debate any less based in intuition.

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NEL CIMITERO DELLE DEFINIZIONI

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NEL CIMITERO DELLE DEFINIZIONI I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SIAMO AUTORIZZATI A IMMAGINARE UNO SPIRITO CHE ESCLAMI : “ORA TUTTO È SENZA OGGETTO PER ME, GIACCHÈ HO DATO LA DEFINIZIONE DI OGNI COSA”?

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LA VOLUNTAD COMO AFECTO-PASIÓN Y SENTIMIENTO

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VOLUNTAD DE PODER R

 

 

 

 

 

 

En el último pasaje citado, Nietzsche dice: todos los afectos son «configuraciones» de la voluntad de poder; y si se pregunta ¿qué es la voluntad de poder?, responde: es el afecto originario. Los afectos son formas de la voluntad; la voluntad es un afecto. Se denomina a esto una definición circular. El entendimiento común se tiene por superior cuando descubre estos «errores de pensamiento» hasta en un filósofo. El afecto es voluntad y la voluntad es afecto. Ya sabemos, por lo menos aproximadamente, que de lo que se trata en la pregunta por la voluntad de poder es de la pregunta por el ser del ente, lo que no puede determinarse ya desde otro ente, puesto que él mismo lo determina.

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QUESTIONING THE DISTINCTION

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QUESTIONING THE DISTINCTION

 

 

 

 

Even though Heidegger insists on these distinctions in a strong way throughout $0″- and $0″&, we have already noted how Being and Time ends by questioning the di’erence between Dasein and other entities, or at least in warning us that it must not become something of an unquestioned dogma. While the fault-lines are already beginning to appear, it is only in $0″/ and $0″0 that these fissures reach a critical point in the overturning of fundamental ontology and in the question of animality.

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WHY WE ARE MORAL

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stirner 7

 

 

 

 

 

 

ALTHOUGH ÷ and as we have many times explained÷morals are modes of conduct which have become customary, and the intent of the passionate rage in support of the moral is to shield these customs from anything which may cause them to vary, this exposition does not explain why these modes, primarily special and particular, adapted to serve the interests not of All but of a Few should have become customary for All: so much so in fact that the guardianship of morals is in the safest hands when it is left to the fierce partisan feelings of the “Crowd.”

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ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VORHANDENSEIN AND NATURE

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esplosione A

 

 

 

 

 

While we have seen that the distinction between Dasein and Vorhandensein is decisive for Heidegger’s di’erentiation between facticity and factuality, it is not immediately obvious what exactly this has to don with nature and naturalism. In the following section I argue that the ontological di’erence and the di’erence between Dasein and Vorhandensein are two important and mutually dependent components of Heidegger’s general resistance to naturalism. But naturalism is a famously slippery term, which historically has come to mean many diverse and often contradictory philosophical positions.

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